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CASENOTE
TAKING CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF NEGLIGENT ACTORS ONE STEP TOO FAR
United States v. Hanousek'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Ninth Circuit's recent holding in United States v. Hanousek continues a trend by courts of holding
criminally liable those individuals who act negligently in violation of public welfare statutes like the Clean
Water Act ("CWA"), regardless of whether they possess any mental culpability.2 Courts historically have
disfavored holding individuals who act with ordinary negligence liable for criminal penalties because criminal
punishment has been reserved for only the worst offenses in which the defendant possesses a requisite level of
mental culpability.3 Since the Industrial Revolution, however, courts have become increasingly willing to allow
criminal penalties for certain acts of ordinary negligence which can be considered public welfare offenses like
the CWA. This Note will discuss the court's holding and reasoning in Hanousek which involves a violation of
the CWA, the history of the United States' courts unwillingness to hold negligent actors criminally liable, how
this case's holding takes the courts' historic use of criminal penalties for negligent actors one step too far, and
the possible implications of Hanousek's overly broad use of criminal penalties for other negligent actors.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
As an employee of Pacific & Arctic Railway and Navigation Company ("Pacific & Arctic"), Edward
Ranousek, Jr., worked as roadmaster of White Pass & Yukon Railroad.4 He was contractually responsible "for
every detail of the safe and efficient maintenance and construction of track, structures and marine facilities of
the entire railroad... and [was to] assume similar duties with similar projects" for a stretch of track between
Skagway, Alaska and Whitehorse, Yukon Territory, Canada.'
One of Hanousek's duties was to supervise a rock-quarrying project at a 1000-foot long work site called "6-
mile" near the Skagway River, a navigable waterway of the United States.6 The project involved realigning a
sharp curve in the railroad track and gathering rock for a ship dock in Skagway. To accomplish the project,Pacific and Arctic employed a contracting company, Hunz & Hunz, to perform the labor and provide the work
supplies.8
A high-pressure petroleum pipeline, owned by Pacific & Arctic's sister company Pacific & Arctic Pipeline,Inc., ran partially above and partially below ground only a few feet from the track.9 To protect the pipeline,
workers followed industry customs and covered about 300 feet of the pipeline with railroad ties, ballast material
and sand.'o After Hanousek assumed project responsibility in May 1994, workers also constructed a moveable
platform that covered the pipeline so workers could travel and carry rock over it to the railroad cars."
On the evening of October 1, 1994, Shane Thoe, a backhoe operator for Hunz & Hunz, was loading rocks
into railroad cars.12 The area where the backhoe operator had been assigned to load the train with the rocks was
covered by the moveable platform.'3 After the train pulled away, Thoe noticed that some rocks that had been
United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 860 (2000).
2 Id.
3 Leslie Yalof Garfield, A More Principled Appmach to Criminalizing Negligence: A Prescnption for the Legislature, 65 TENN.
L.REv. 875, 890-91 (1998).
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caught in the train's plow were lying off the tracks beyond the protected area of the pipeline.'4 On his own,
Thoe decided to move them with his backhoe.'" Because that area of the site had been graded to finish grade,
the pipeline was covered by dirt.'6 As Thoe operated the backhoe next to the track to sweep away the rocks, he
struck and ruptured the pipeline causing the discharge of between 1000 to 5000 gallons of heating oil over the
course of several days into the Skagway River." Appellant Hanousek was not present when the oil pipeline
ruptured, which caused the lawsuit which is the topic of this Note.'"
After an investigation, the United States charged Hanousek with two counts.'9 Hanousek was charged with
one count of negligently placing a harmful quantity of oil into United States' navigable water, thus violating the
Clean Water Act provisions 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c)(1)(A) 20 and 1321 (b)(3), 2' and with one count of conspiracy
to provide U.S. Coast Guard officials investigating the accident with false information, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ §371 and 100 1.2 Hanousek's appeal, which is the subject of this casenote, followed a district court jury
verdict convicting Hanousek of negligently discharging a harmful quantity of oil into United States water and
acquitting him of the charge of conspiracy to provide false informationY The district court sentenced him to
six months in prison, six months in a halfway house, six months of supervised release and fined him $5,000.24
The Ninth Circuit upheld Hanousek's criminal conviction2 for negligently discharging a harmful amount of
oil into United States navigable water violating 33 U.S.C. sections 1319 (c)(1)(A).26 The court found that a
person who acted negligently and is charged with violating section 1319(c)(1)(A) can face criminal penalties, as
provided by the plain language of the statute.2 The court also found that because section 1319(c)(1)(A) is a
public welfare statute, a court can impose criminal penalties on an individual who negligently violates it.28
Moreover, the court held that the jury was properly instructed on ordinary negligence and causation by the
district court and that the district court did not err by not providing the jury with Hanousek's proposed
instruction on vicarious liability.29 The court's final conclusion was that the criminal conviction should be







20 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 - 1387 (1994); see 33 U.S.C. § 1319(cXXA) (1994) (providing that
criminal penalties are available for the individuals who "negligently violate[] section... 1321(bX3).. of this title").
2 33 U.S.C. 1321(bX3) (1994) (stating that "[Tihe discharge of oil or hazardous substance ... into the navigable waters of the United
States ... in such quantities as may be harmful ... is prohibited .... ").
n Hanousek, 176 F.3d at 1119. M. Paul Taylor, an officer of Arctic & Pacific and of Arctic & Pacific Pipeline, Inc. was also
charhed and eventually acquitted of all but two counts. Id. at n. 1.
Id. at 1120.
24 Id.25 Id. at 1126.
26 33 U.S.C. § 1319(cXIXA) (1994).
27 Hanousek, 176 F.3d at 1121.
2 Id "Public welfare legislation is designed to protect the public from potentially harmful or injurious items ... and may render
criminal 'a type of conduct that a reasonable person should know is subject to stringent public regulation and may seriously threaten the
community's health or safety,"' Id. (citing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607 (1994) for the proposition that the public should be
protected from harm; citing Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419,433, (1985) for the proposition that a reasonable person should know
that the public will regulate threats).
' Hanousek, 176 F.3d at 1121.
3"Id. at 1125. See U.S. SENTENCINGGUIDELINESMANUAL § 311.1 (1998). This provision states that the court may "increase the
offense level as follows: (a) If the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or
was otherwise extensive, increase by 4 levels. (b) If the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) and the
criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 3 levels. (c) If the defendant was an
organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity other than described in (a) or (b), increase by 2 levels. Id. The
guidelines also define a participant as a "person who is criminally responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have been
convicted ..." Id. at Application Note 1. See also U.S. SENrENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 5C 1.1 (1998) (allowing the sentencing for
such crimes to be satisfied by a sentence of imprisonment.").
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A principle issue in Hanousek case is whether a court can impose criminal liability on a defendant who has
acted with ordinary negligence. To understand how the Hanousek court came to the conclusion that it could
impose such criminal liability on the defendant who had acted with ordinary negligence, one must consider the
evolution of criminal punishment and why courts consider some types of negligent actions sufficient to warrant
criminal punishment.
Criminal punishment, historically, has served many purposes including protecting society from harm by
criminals, preventing individuals from participating in criminal conduct, and punishing criminals for their
wrongful acts.3' According to Oliver Wendall Holmes, criminal law and the resulting punishment serve to
"coerce individuals to conform their behavior to societal norms."32 Utilitarian theorists believe that punishing
criminals helps maintain order in society and, thus, creates better future behavior in other members of society. 3
Utilitarians believe that deterrence is key in an orderly society and that such deterrence rests on "free will" -
the fact that people will weigh the benefits of committing a crime against the harms from criminal punishments
in determining which path to take34
When individuals are held criminally responsible for their acts of ordinary negligence, some question the
ability of the punishment to deter because to hold a negligent person liable for such a crime requires no showing
that the individual even knew what he or she was doing had potentially harmful effects.35 Historically, in early
English criminal law, ordinary negligence was sufficient to warrant criminal punishment." However, the
Anglican Church believed it was wrong to punish without a degree of moral blameworthiness.3 ' And, by the
end of the nineteenth century, American and British courts could not impose criminal punishment without proof
of a requisite mental state or at least gross negligence. Still today, most states only punish for gross
negligence or greater degrees of fault.
Most states, however, recognize limited exceptions which enable criminal liability to be placed on
individuals who have acted with ordinary negligence.39 Generally, those exceptions include instances where
the court finds that a defendant, regardless of his or her mental state, has negligently handled an inherently
dangerous instrument, engaged in an inherently dangerous activity or engaged in conduct that could cause
widespread public injury.40 These exceptions are likely well within Holmes' reasoning because he believed it
was perfectly proper to sacrifice one inadvertently negligent actor to the rigors of criminal punishment if it
created a greater good for society. 41 Others, however, feel that punishing individuals who lack mental
culpability causes unintended harm and, thus, feel that under no circumstances should someone who is merely
negligent face criminal liability. 42
The Supreme Court has continuously held that, given the right circumstances and set of facts, it will allow
criminal punishment for ordinary negligence. 43 Hanousek cited numerous Supreme Court cases from as early as1922 which held that criminal punishment was valid in punishing a negligent actor guilty of violating a public
welfare statute.44
31 Garfield, supra note 3, at 877 n.4 (citing Oliver Wendall Holmes, Jr., THE COMMON LAW 49 (1923); see also Wayne R. LaFave &Austin W. Scott, Jr., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5 at 22 (2d ed. 1986).32 Id
3 Id. at 881.
3 Id. at 882.
Id. at 883.
3 Id. at 888.
37 Id.
Id. at 889.
3 Id. at 890-91.
4 Id. See generally United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277,281 (1943); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250,254 (1922)(recognizing that the state can impose the duty of acting with care on innocent individuals in order to lessen public danger and ill effects.)Garfield, supra, note 3 at 884-85, n.30.
42 Id. (citing Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded From Penal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 632,641 (1963)).
4 Id. at 882, n.9.
4 See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994); Liprarota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985); Morissette v. United States,342 U.S. 246 (1952); Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281; Balint, 258 U.S. at 250 (supporting the proposition that under the right circumstances
a court is justified in holding a person guilty of ordinary negligence criminally liable.)
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The first case Hanousek cited was United States v. Balint.4 5 In Balint, the Court reasoned that an individual
accused of violating a public welfare statute was in the best position to prevent the violation from occurring,
thus he or she should be held criminally liable if the violation is severe enough.4 The Court overturned a
demurrer to the indictment where several individuals were charged and held criminally liable for their negligent
acts of selling opium and coca leaf derivatives in violation of a federal statute.47 The individuals in this case
who were criminally charged under the Anti-Narcotic Act had themselves negligently sold the drugs and, thus,
violated the statute.
Another case considered by the Hanousek court was United States v. Dotterweich.4 The Court in
Dotterweich upheld a finding of criminal liability for the negligent acts of an individual who violated the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.49 In Dotterweich, the court held that under the statute Dotterweich, the
president and general manager of a pharmaceutical company, was guilty of a misdemeanor for negligently
shipping misbranded and adulterated drugs.so In this case, as in Balint, the defendant acted in violation of the
statute and did not violate it through an omission or failure to act.5' The Court cited court's decision in Balint
and the utilitarian notion that it is better to protect the larger interest by placing the burden on an individual in
rationalizing its decision to hold Dotterweich criminally liable." The Court reasoned that because of the nature
of Dotterweich's business - as a jobber for drugs - he should have been aware of the possibility of a violation
and should have exercised due care.53 The Court based their decision to hold Dotterweich liable on the theory
that the public expects responsible parties to act when dealing with harmful or potentially harmful products. 4
The Hanousek court also discussed Morissette v. United States." In Morissette, the Court reversed the
Sixth Circuit's affirmation of the district court's conviction of Joseph Edward Morissette,5 who was charged
with embezzling, stealing or knowingly converting any property owned by the government." Such acts carry
criminal penalties.," Morissette, a well-liked community member and World War II veteran, had picked up
three tons of bomb casings he found lying in a field while out hunting in the Michigan woods. Morissette then
took them to be crushed and was paid $84 for them.60 Throughout the entire investigation, Morissette
continually professed his innocence, told investigators exactly what he had done, and claimed he had no idea he
had violated a statute.' In holding that Morissette did not violate the statute, the Court reasoned that
presumptive intent should not be used in this case and that Congress' ability to imply culpability for the
violation of certain statutes had its limits.62 The Court also emphasized that, though courts did occasionally
hold negligent actors criminally responsible for their acts, the exact line for when it was permissible and when it
was not had not been delineated clearly by any of the courts.63
The Morissette Court said it is the responsibility of Congress, not the courts, to decide at what point it
should assign criminal punishment for negligent acts through determining when potential unfairness to certain
defendants is outweighed by the benefit to society of deterring harmful behavior.64 The Court said that it is the
4s Balint, 258 U.S. at 250.
46 Id. The court stated that "Again where one deals with others and his mere negligence may be dangerous to them.. .the policy of
the law may, in order to stimulate proper care, require the punishment of the negligent person .... " Id.
4 Id. at 251-52. The court reasoned that Congress had rationalized that even if it meant that an innocent purchaser of drugs might
face criminal liability, the statute was intended to place criminal punishment on any violators. Id.
4 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 277.
4 Id. at 285.
- Id. at 278.
51 Id.
2 Id. at 281.
' Id. at 280.
5 See genemlly Kevin A. Gaynor & Thomas R. Bartman, Criminal Enforcement ofEnvironmental Laws, 10 COLO. I INT'L ENvT.
L. & PoL'Y (1999) (citing Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 277 and United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975)).
" Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
56 Id.
57Id.
2 Id. at 247.
5 Id.
" Id. at 247.
61 Id. at 248.
62 Id. at 256.
6 Id. at 260.
6 Garfield, supra note. 3, at 886.
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responsibility of courts, on the other hand, act to assure the fairness of legislation and assure it is only applied to
when widespread public injury or participation in an inherently dangerous activity might be deterred by its
enactment. In the Morissette, Dotterweich and Balint cases, the Court attempted to determine what
boundaries to place on criminal liability for negligent actions, but has largely acted inconsistently." Clearly,
any real directive regarding under exactly what circumstances, if any, a court should impose criminal liability
would likely have to be the Congress, not the courts.
Environmental violations, as in Hanousek, are often considered by the courts and by Congress to be public
welfare offenses.67 Specifically, violations of the Clean Water Act are considered public welfare offenses." In
United States v. Frezzo Brothers, Inc., the Third Circuit upheld the criminal conviction of an individual guilty
of ordinary negligence, stating that the Clean Water Act gave the prosecutor greater leeway because it had a
reasonableness standard which said that a person could be held criminally liable if a reasonable person would
have known of the likelihood of such a spill.69 Additionally, in State v. Hazelwood (commonly known as the
"Exxon Valdez" case), the Alaska court upheld a conviction under the Clean Water Act based on ordinary
negligence because of the important public policy in deterring future oil spills.70 The court held that
"Reasonable deterrence... is the basic principle of the due process balance between individual and societal
71interests.
Generally, public welfare cases require that the prosecution prove that the defendant knew his or her
conduct was illegal. 2 In United States v. Ahmad the Fifth Circuit held that in order to be criminally liable, the
defendant must have knowingly violated the CWA; the court further held that violating the CWA is not a public
welfare offense and thus should not carry criminal penalties for negligent conduct.
In Hanousek, the court based the defendant's criminal liability on 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(A). 74 This
provision says if a person is negligent - "[a]ny person who violates section ... 132 1(b)(3) ... of this title ... shall
be punished" by a fine or imprisonment or both. Congress stated in section 1321 (b)(3) that there shall be a
policy against discharges of oil "in or upon the navigable waters of the United States, adjoining shorelines, or
into or upon the waters of the contiguous zone."76
Given the variety of interpretations of public welfare statutes only within the Courts of Appeals and
Supreme Court in the last 70 or 80 years, clearly the legal history is very inconsistent and is subject to
individual judge's feelings regarding the facts of each specific case.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals began its analysis by addressing Hanousek's contention that the district
court had failed to instruct the jury that, under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(a), Hanousek had to have been proven by
the government to have acted with criminal negligence, not just ordinary negligence. 7 The district court had
provided the jury with an ordinary negligence definition.7 ' The court considered this a question of statutory
interpretation to be reviewed de novo.79
65 Id. at 888.
6 Cf Morissette, 342 U.S. at 246; United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922).67 Garfield, supra note 3, at 904.
6 Id. at 905.
6 Garfield, supra note 3, at 905-06 (discussing United States v. Frezzo Brothers, Inc., 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979)).
70 Id. at 907-09 (discussing State v. Hazelwood, 946 P.2d 875, 884 (Alaska 1997)).
71Id. (discussing Hazelwood, 946 P.2d at 884).
7 See generally Lawrence Friedman & H. Hamilton Hackney M, Questions ofIntent: Environmental Cnmes and "Public Welfare"
Offenses, 10 ViLL. ENvT L.J. (1999).
7 101 F.3d 386, 387 (5th Cir. 1996).
7 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (cXIXA) (1994).
7 Id. §§ 1319, 1321.
76 Id. § 1321(bX3).
7 United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9 h Cir. 1999). Hanousek argued that the definition of gross negligence was "a
gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation." See also MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.022Xd) (1985).
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To determine criminal liability, the Hanousek court looked at the plain language of the Clean Water Act
codified in sections 1319(c)(1)(A) and 1321 (b)(3), which together determine criminal liability.8" The court
looked at the relevant sections and at the entire Clean Water Act and found that neither explicitly defined the
term "negligently," so it then looked to the ordinary definition in Black's Law Dictionary." The court defined
"negligently" as "a failure to use such care as a reasonably prudent and careful person would use under similar
circumstances."82 Using that definition, the court reasoned that had Congress intended a heightened standard
for negligence, it would have stated so, as it did in 33 U.S.C. § 132 l(b)(7)(D)." The court concluded that case
history also supported the conclusion that if Congress intends a certain standard in one part of the statute and
includes it there, but not elsewhere, the omission is intentional and should not be implied."
Hanousek next argued that Congress could not have meant to differentiate between "negligen[cel" in 33
U.S.C. § 19(c)(1)(A) from "gross negligence" in 33 U.S.C. § 132 1(b)(7)(D) because the latter phrase was just
added to the statute in the 1990 Amendments." However, the court directly rejected this argument because
there is a presumption that Congress knows its former legislation and passes laws with it in mind.
Hanousek next argued that the court violated his right to due process by using an ordinary negligence
standard to determine that he was guilty of a criminal violation.87 The court reviewed de novo whether the
conviction violated Hanousek's due process." The Clean Water Act's criminal provisions are considered
public welfare legislation, which means they are designed to protect the public from potentially dangerous
consequences." Additionally, the court recognized its ability to enforce the public welfare statutes and cause
conduct that a reasonable person knows would likely be subject to strict public regulation and may harm the
community's safety and health to be subject to criminal penalties." As such, the Ninth Circuit noted that courts
have long held that a person found to have negligently violated a public welfare statute could be subject to
criminal liability without his or her due process being violated.9' Then, the court rejected Hanousek's attempt
to distinguish Weizenhoff' where Hanousek argued that, unlike the defendants in that case who were permittees,
he was only a roadmaster in charge of overseeing the construction project.9 The court said that this difference
did not matter because, as the roadmaster, Hanousek still should have been on notice that he was dealing with a
strict liability offense because of the high-pressure pipeline and his willingness to admit that he was not
unaware of potential hazards." The court concluded that given the facts of the case and the precedent,
Hanousek's due process was not violated because he was subject to criminal liability for his ordinary
negligence.9
The court next addressed Hanousek's argument that the district court erred when it did not instruct the jury
that he could not be vicariously liable for the backhoe operator's negligence.95 Again, the court reviewed de
novo and stated that it would affirm the district court if it found the lower court's instructions adequately
covered the defense theory." The court then compared the instructions that the district court used with
a Id. See generally In re Rufener Constr. Inc., 53 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1995). Declaring that plain language means the reader
must "derive meaning from [the] context, and this requires reading the relevant statutory provisions as a whole." Id. at 1120 (cited by
the Hanousek court as "Carpenters Health and Welfare Trust Funds v. Robertson (In re Rufener Constr.), 53 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1995)").
" Hanousek, 176 F.3d at 1121; BLACK's LAw DIcnoNARY, 1035 (6th ed. 1990).
g2 Id. at 112 1.
* Id.
8 Id. (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, (1983)).
8 Id. See also Oil Pollution Control Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (1990).
8 Id. See also United States v. Trident Seafoods Corp., 92 F.3d 855, 862 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1109 (1997).
7 Id.
* Id. See also United States v. Savinovich, 845 F.2d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 1988).
9 Id. See also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600,607 (1994); United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1286 (specifically
stating that the CWA's criminal provisions "are clearly designed to protect the public at large from the potentially dire consequences of
water pollution.. .and as such fall within the category of public welfare legislation.")
90 Id. (citing Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419,433 (1985)).
9' Id. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 607; Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,256 (1952); United States v. Dotterweich 320 U.S.
277,281 (1943); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
9 Id. at 1122.
93 Id. See also Staples, 511 U.S. at 607 (holding that as long as the defendant knew that he was dealing with a dangerous device that




MELPR, Vol. 7, No. 2
Hanousek's suggested instructions which the court rejected and concluded that the district court had satisfied its
duty to explain to the jury that Hanousek could be convicted only on his negligence, not on the negligence of
others working on the site.Y
Hanousek also argued that the district court erroneously allowed the government to strike "foul blows" in
closing arguments by telling the jury it could convict Hanousek based on vicarious liability." The court
ultimately found that the prosecutor acted appropriately in telling the jury that both Hanousek and Taylor were
responsible and should both be held liable."
Hanousek's fourth argument was that the district court, in instructing the jury on causation, failed to inform
them that in order to find him guilty under both provisions, the result must have been within the foreseeable risk
of Hanousek's conduct.' Hanousek, the court said, did not object, but instead requested that the court offer thejury the Model Penal Code § 2.03 instruction.'o' The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court's
instruction was adequate because it required the jury to find a "direct and substantial" connection to the
discharge of oil.'o2
The court then addressed whether Hanousek's sentence was warranted given the sufficiency of the
evidence.'03 Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the court considered
whether a rational finder of fact could have found against Hanousek beyond a reasonable doubt.'"4 The court
concluded that the evidence was, in fact, sufficient to warrant Hanousek's conviction for violating 33 U.S.C. §§
1319(c)(1)(A) and 1321(b)(3).os
Hanousek's final argument was that his sentence was too excessive.'0 Hanousek argued that the court
erroneously increased his punishment two levels because he was a supervisor. 07 The court found that under
United States Sentencing Guidelines § 3Bl.1(c), the district court acted within its discretion in increasing
Hanousek's sentence because of his supervisory role.(a
Hanousek, the court contended, correctly found mathematical errors in the final judgment, but also found
these errors merely clerical in nature and that they did not affect Hanousek's sentence." 9 Although Hanousek
argued that the court erroneously relied on that incorrect information from the probation officer that said the
sentence had to be served as a term of imprisonment, this court did possess the ability to determine the
sentence.i1 0 And, though the Ninth Circuit lacked jurisdiction to determine the correctness of Hanousek's
sentence, it recognized the district court's ability to use its discretion in determining the sentence. 'I
In conclusion, the court held that first, that Congress, in 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3), created criminal penalties
for negligent violators; second, that convictions under section 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) and 1319(c)(1)(A) do not
violate due process; third, that the court provided the jury with the proper instruction; fourth, that the district
court was specifically correct in its instructions regarding causation and vicarious liability; fifth, that the district
court did not err in refusing to provide Hanousek's instructions to the jury on vicarious liability; sixth, that there
9 Id. at 1123.
" Id. The prosecutor detailed what had happened and said to the jury that the "buck stops" with Hanousek and M. Paul Taylor, an
officer of the pipeline. Id.
9 Id.
'" Id. at 1124. The court noted that during trial Hanousek did not directly object to the instruction, which said Hanousek should be
held liable if his conduct had a direct and substantial connection to the oil spill and if that spill would not have happened without his
actions. Id.
101 Id. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(3) (providing that "the element of causation is not established if the actual result is not within the
risk of which the particular defendant was aware or should have been aware unless: (a) the actual result differs from the probably result
only in the respect that a different person or different property is injured or harm would have been more serious or more extensive than
that caused; or (b) the actual result involves the same kind of injury of harm as the probable result and is not too remote or accidental in
its occurrence to have a just bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense.").
In' Id. at 1124 (citing United States v. Warren, 25 F.3d 890, 895-96 (9th Cir. 1994), which says a court can choose to not use proposed
defense theories if they are essentially the same as others covered in the instructions already given).103 id.
104 id.




"0 Id. at 1126.
'" Id.
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was enough evidence to support Hanosuek's conviction; and, seventh, that Hanousek's sentence was proper
under the sentencing guidelines.' 2
V. COMMENT
In Hanousek, the Ninth Circuit supported its decision to hold the defendant criminally liable for his ordinary
negligence based on years of court precedent, dating back to the Industrial Revolution."' However, through
examining the specific facts of Hanousek and comparing them with precedent, the court arguably has
overstepped its bounds. Because Hanousek actually committed an omission, was not the one who directly acted
in violation the statute in causing the oil spill and had no way of knowing that the train would cause rocks to
land near the tracks, he should not be subject to the same criminal liability used by courts to punish other
negligent actors.
Courts have considered criminal liability appropriate for some negligent actors because, under a utilitarian
view, such punishment will deter future wrongdoing and thus benefit the society as a whole.114 Under this view,
if only one individual's autonomy and freedom are compromised to increase the happiness, safety and well
being of society, the punishment is justified even if the person punished completely lacked mental culpability.
Because courts grant such punishments only in public welfare offenses, courts have justified them, saying that
society is better protected and is healthier through the punishment of one individual."' Additionally, because
many of these public welfare offenses are environmental in nature and thus hard to detect and prove, once an
individual is found to have acted in some way to contribute to the crime, courts are likely to want to punish him
or her in any way if it might mean the prevention of future harm. Deterrence is a critical factor in courts'
decisions to hold negligent actors criminally liable."' 6 In Hanousek's case, the Ninth Circuit essentially held
that, but for the negligent supervision of the backhoe operator, this accident would not have occurred and, given
a supervisor's responsibility and duty to control those who are under him or her, Hanousek deserved to receive
the harsher criminal punishment."t7
For several reasons, the specific facts of the Hanousek case show that the Ninth Circuit overstepped its
bounds in finding the appellant criminally liable for several reasons. Hanousek supervised Thoe, the backhoe
driver, on the "6-mile" site."' Thoe's responsibility was to take the rock from the quarry, cart it up a hill across
the protected area of pipeline and load it in the train for transport to the pier that was under construction."
Hanousek never requested that Thoe look out for the possibility that the train might pick up some rocks and
deposit them further up alongside the track; additionally, the court never indicated that the train had ever picked
up rock before or that Thoe had taken the initiative to go pick up the extra rock if that had ever happened
before.' 20 Furthermore, Hanousek was not even present at the time Thoe ruptured the pipeline with his
backhoe; thus, he could not have imagined a circumstance under which Thoe would have to go outside the
bounds of his employment responsibilities because of the train.121
11 Id. Hanousek, the court contended, correctly found mathematical errors in the final judgment, but also found these errors merely
clerical in nature and that they did not affect Hanousek's sentence. Id. Although Hanousek argued that the court erroneously relied on
that incorrect information from the probation officer that said the sentence had to be served as a term of imprisonment, this court did
possess the ability to determine the sentence. Id. And, though the Ninth Circuit lacked jurisdiction to determine the correctness of
Hanousek's sentence, it recognized the district court's ability to use its discretion in determining the sentence. Id.
"3 See generally Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952); United States v. Dotterweich 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v.
Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
"' Garfield, supra, note 3, at 877-78. The author notes that the number one goal of modern criminal punishment is to protect society
from harm. Id Thus, modern criminal law focuses on the utilitarian aspect of punishment, rather than simply on the retributivist notion
of punishing the wrongdoer with an amount of punishment equal to his or her crime. Id.
" Id. at 878-79. The author discusses the development of such public welfare offenses as a reaction to the increasing technology of
the Industrial Revolution. Id.
"6 Benjamin S. Sharp, Environmental Enforcement Excesses: Overcriminalization and Too Severe Punishment, 21 ENvTL. L. REP.
10658-(1991) (referencing a 1987 EPA memorandum citing deterrence as the main reason to use criminal punishment for negligent
actors).
"' Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1999).
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The Hanousek decision lacks evidence that Hanousek's negligence was the proximate cause of Thoe's
rupture of the pipeline because of the presence of a superseding intervening cause - the train. Looking at the
facts above - that Hanousek was not present when the accident occurred, that the plow of the train happened to
pick up some rocks and carry them beyond the train, and that it occurred to Thoe to leave his worksite and pick
up the extra rocks (something he was not instructed to do nor had ever done in the past) - it seems that the
element of proximate cause is missing. More specifically, the court never indicates that Hanousek's failure to
realize that such a problem could occur actually caused the problem. And, given the number of odd occurrences
which caused Thoe to travel past the work platform and onto the unprotected area, the court is arguably
unreasonable in assigning criminal liability to Hanousek. Were he to have been the person who, knowing
which area had been protected by the work platform, chose to drive the backhoe over to pick up the rocks on the
soft soil, criminally liability could reasonably attach to his actions given the interpretation of previous courts.
However, the fact that he could have honestly never predicted such a set of circumstances leaves the use of
criminal punishment for Hanousek unreasonable and void of the positive social effect that courts use to justify
its use in such public welfare situations.
Many of the cases that the Hanousek court relied on are not on point and do not support its holding.
Furthermore, many seem to have facts and reasoning which contradict Hanousek's conviction. In Balint,
Morissette, and Dotterweich, each defendant was charged with criminal liability because he acted positively in
violating a statutory provision. However, in Hanousek, the court never alleged that Hanousek positively acted
in violation - only that he failed to take precautions necessary to prevent Thou's act from causing a violation of
the Clean Water Act. Thus, this seems almost to add an extra step to the Supreme Court's reasoning in the three
previous cases. That is, prior to Hanousek, cases indicated that an individual could be subject to criminal
liability if he or she acted in violation of a public welfare statute that the individual should have known about.
Under Hanousek, however, an individual can be held criminally liable if, because of his or her negligent failure
to take necessary precautions which the court deems he or she should have known might be necessary, another
person acts in violation of a statute. The Hanousek court basically says that because Hanousek was responsible
for overseeing the loading of rocks onto the train by Thoe and other backhoe operators, he should have also
been able to foresee the likelihood that the train which would carry the rocks from the site, would get rocks
stuck in the plow and, additionally, would somehow expel those rocks at a point beyond the covered work site.
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Weitzenhoffheld that the defendants, managers of a Hawaii sewage
treatment plant operated under an EPA permit through the Clean Water Act, were guilty of criminal violations
for violating their permit even though they did not know the requirements or existence of a permit but only
knew that their conduct resulted in a violation.122 The court found against the defendants because it found
important the fact that though ignorant of violating the permit itself, the two individuals realized that they were
bypassing filtration devices in placing the pollutants directly into the Pacific Ocean.123 This case is
distinguishable from Hanousek - and even would act to support not using criminal penalties. In Weitzenhoff
the defendants both knew that their acts were covered by a permit, and though they believed they were
complying with the provisions of the permit, their actions in bypassing part of the pipe and placing the
pollutants directly into the water were certainly within their control. Unlike the defendants in Weitzenhoff
Hanousek committed no action which could be deemed to cause the rupture of the pipeline, yet the court found
that his failure to realize the other area of the pipeline should be covered was sufficient to establish criminal
liability. Additionally, in Weitzenhoff the two individuals actually committed the crime - in contrast to
Hanousek's mere supervisory role.
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit cited Morissette to establish that courts use criminal responsibility to punish
negligent actors where they believe the negligent actor is in a better position to prevent the violation with no
more care or exertion than would be reasonably expected given his or her duties.124 In Hanousek, the court
never considered what actions Hanousek could have actually taken that would have prevented the accident from
occurring because Hanousek arguable exercised reasonable care. Using that test, Hanousek, likely, never could
have reasonably considered the possibility that a train might strew rock beyond the area where Thoe and other
workers loaded rocks on the train. Moreover, given that there was a protective covering across the entire area
12 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1994).
12 Id. at 1275.
124 United States v. Morisette, 342 U.S. 246,256 (1952).
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necessary to cross with backhoes to load the train, it would also appear that Hanousek had taken adequate
precaution to prevent a violation of the public welfare statute, even if he did know what the statute required in
terms of protection. The court in Hanousek seemed to imply that, as a supervisor, Hanousek needed to possess
extrasensory powers which enable him to envision any possible scenario. However, given the court's test in
Morissette, which is cited in Hanousek but not applied therein, the appellant likely would not have been found
guilty of violating the CWA.
The Ninth Circuit cited Balint to support the proposition that an individual can be found guilty of a public
welfare offense where he or she acts with ordinary negligence.'2 However, the Hanousek court also cited a
passage from the Balint decision appearing to support holding Thoe criminally responsible for his own
actions.'2 The passage appears to allow individuals who unknowingly violate a statute through their actions -
as seen in the examples given - to be held criminally liable. However, in Hanousek, the appellant was only
convicted based on a failure to act - and arguably, his failure to act did not cause the accident. Instead, it was
the negligent act of Thoe in driving the backhoe into an area where he was not authorized or supposed to work
which created the statutory violation - the oil spill.
Given these doubts as to whether Hanousek can be held to fall within the requirements set for the in other
cases, one must consider whether such criminal penalties are really the answer to curing violations of public
welfare statutes. Clearly, if one believes that Hanousek could in some way have realized that the statute
necessitated his placing a protective cover over that portion of the pipeline where the break occurred, then the
belief that criminal punishment for negligent acts has a deterrent effect has some legs on which to stand.
However, because Hanousek had no way to predict the problem, it would not be reasonable to hold him
criminally liable if one considers the numerous factors at play here which Hanosuek had no way to control.
Regardless of whether deterrence can be accomplished by sacrificing Hanousek, there are several
arguments in opposition to the use of criminal penalties for negligent violators of public welfare acts. Because
such criminal punishment actually ends up punishing the innocent, the notions of retributivism and "just
desserts" are offended and rejected by the court's actions. Retributivists contend that criminal punishment for
ordinary negligence ends up punishing the innocent, thus defying the very notions of retributivism because the
punishment is not directed to a specific "wrong." Retributivists believe that punishment's goal instead should
be to make the wronged party whole and to punish the guilty party to the exact extent that he or she created
harm.'27 Punishing individuals found to have acted with ordinary negligence requires no mental element - a
key component in any other criminal conviction. Thus, how can future individuals prevent the actions if the
negligent actors did not intend their results in the first place. Also, critics say that punishing ordinary negligent
conduct will lessen the force and threat of criminal punishment causing it to be less effective. 28
Such punishment may even deter qualified individuals from taking potentially risky jobs in industries
closely tied to the environment - such as the oil and shipping industries. Responsible individuals will find
gainful employment elsewhere, rather than risk potential prison time for failing to monitor their employees
closely enough or for being negligent actors. Because Hanousek was punished for unpredictable circumstances,
it is unlikely that anyone will want to supervise employees, especially in the oil industry given the potential
responsibilities for employees' actions.
Hence, the key question remains: when should ordinary negligence be applied to public welfare statutes?
Or, how should ordinary negligence be punished under public welfare statutes? The deterrent effect is
questionable because the criminal punishment for negligent crimes involves no mental state and in no other area
of the law would individuals be subject to prison time. Thus, it is illogical to hold ordinary negligent
defendants like Hanousek criminally liable.
Without concrete evidence that these actors could have prevented the harm and without concrete evidence
that the punishment would really deter future offenders, it would seem that hefty monetary and mitigation
penalties might serve the same purpose, while not punishing the morally innocent with unnecessary
imprisonment. In fact, because these crimes require specific remedies - cleaning up an oil spill in this case -
"' United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 - 53 (1922).
126 Id. "[Wihere one deals with others and his mere negligence may be dangerous to them, as in selling diseased food or poison, the
policy of the law may, in order to stimulate proper care, require the punishment of the negligent person though he be ignorant of the
noxious character of what he sells." Id.
127 Garfield, supm note 3, at 911.
128 id.
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imprisonment does not serve such a purpose. However, chances are that if the change is to ever occur, the
legislature and not the courts will have to be the leading force behind it.12 If the criminal system's main goals
are punishment and deterrence and neither is achievable, then it is futile to imprison individuals like Hanousek.
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts should abandon the tradition of applying the negligence standard for crimes convicted under the
CWA and other public welfare statutes. Given the fact that since the Industrial Revolution courts have upheld
criminal convictions for negligent actors under public welfare statutes, the trend will likely continue. However,Hanousek, which was denied certiorari by the Supreme Court, does stand to be distinguished and overturned
given the lack of direct precedent and reasoning.'" This case should be distinguished based on the presence of
superseding intervening cause, the lack of proximate cause, the inability of the court to gain firm support from
Supreme Court precedent and, simply, the facts of the case. Because the train caused the rocks to land in the
unprotected area, placing Hanousek in a halfway house remedies very little since his only means of control lies
in his ability to read a crystal ball and see the bizarre twist of fate that the plow of a train can cause.
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' Garfield, supra note 3, at 886-87.
' Hanousek v. United States 120 S.Ct. 860 (2000). In his dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,
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